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LowE v. SEC: GUARANTEEING THE RIGHT TO
PUBLISH INVESTMENT NEWSLETTERS THROUGH
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
In a recent series of cases culminating with Lowe v. SEC,1 federal
courts have considered whether one must register as an investment ad-
viser with the SEC before publishing a newsletter containing
nonindividualized investment advice. Within this issue lies a fundamen-
tal tension between the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech,
and the federal securities laws inhibiting this freedom in order to protect
investors. In Lowe, a majority of the Supreme Court avoided complex
constitutional questions by holding that a nonregistered publisher's pub-
lication of investment newsletters not offering personalized advice falls
within a statutory exclusion of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.2
The concurring Justices agreed that the publisher need not register the
publication, but based their conclusion on the constitutional right of free
speech.3
Congress enacted the Investment Advisers Act of 1940' ("IAA" or
"Act") as part of a series of statutes intended to protect investors from
abuses in the securities industry,5 such as malpractice by persons paid for
1. 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
2. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2573-74. See also infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. Justice
Stevens wrote the majority opinion, in which Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor
joined. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision.
3. Id. at 2574. See also infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text. Justice White wrote the
concurnng opinion, in which Justices Burger and Rehnquist joined.
4. Ch. 686, tit. 2, 54 Stat. 847 (1940) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I to 80b-21
(1982)). For discussion of the Act's background and the history of its passage and amendment, see
Comment, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Supreme Court: Private Rights of Action
Under the New Cort Test, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 54 (1981). For criticisms and recommended changes in
the Act, see Ahart, Suggested Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act, 6 SEC REG. L.J. 226
(1978); Rosenblatt & Lybecker, Some Thoughts on the Federal Securities Laws Regulating External
Investment Management Arrangements and the ALI Federal Securities Code Project, 24 U. PA. L.
REv. 587 654-80 (1976).
5. SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). Preceding the IAA were: the
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982); the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982); the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6
(1982); the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1982); and the Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ lOa-1 to 80a-64 (1982). The basic purpose of these acts was the
substitution of a philosophy of full disclosure for that of caveat emptor, thus creating a higher stan-
dard of ethics in the securities industry. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S. at 186. Past abuses in the
industry have been perceived to be contributing factors in the 1929 stock market crash and the
subsequent Depression. Id. See generally Ahart, Advising the Individual Investor: Comparing the
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their investment advice.6 The Act prohibits persons within its broad defi-
nition of "investment advisers" 7 from conducting business unless they
register with the SEC.8 The Act also prohibits advisers from engaging in
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts9 at the risk of revocation of
their registration,10 injunctive proceedings t1 and criminal penalties.12
Federal Regulation of Investment Advisers, Banks and Broker-Dealers, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 31
(1978) (comparing the federal regulations governing the conduct of banks, broker-dealers and invest-
ment advisers rendering investment advice to individuals).
6. As summarized by the Senate Report on the 1960 amendments to the IAA, the general
objective of the Act is "to protect the public and investors against malpractices by persons paid for
advising others about securities." S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960). See also Abra-
hamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 870-73 (2d Cir. 1977) (IAA shows legislation was needed to
control problems with advisory services); 1 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS
149-93 (1978) (discussing the definition of an investment adviser and the regulation to which one is
subjected); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 733-48 (1983) (discussing the
regulation of investment advisers); Note, The Regulation of Investment Advisers, 14 STAN. L. REV.
837 (1962) (discussing the operation of investment advisers under existing legislation and the need
for more stringent regulation).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(l 1) (1982) defines "investment adviser" as
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, either di-
rectly or through publications or writings, as to-the value of securities or as to the advisa-
bility of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for compensation and as part
of a regular business, issues or promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities....
The Act provides several exclusions from this definition. See infra notes 13-16 and accompanying
text.
8. The Act makes it unlawful to use the mails or any instrumentality of interstate commerce in
connection with the business of investment advising unless one is registered as an investment adviser.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (1982).
Registration entails substantial burdens. An application for registration must contain information
about, inter alia, the applicant's education, business affiliations for the past ten years, the manner of
giving investment advice and rendering analyses, and the applicant's finances. Id. at § 80b-3(c)(l)
(A)-(H). Registered investment advisers must maintain numerous records of their assets, liabilities,
income, capital and more. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (1985) (regulation enacted by SEC pursuant to 15
U.S.C. § 80b-4).
Certain investment advisers, such as those advising only insurance companies, may not have to
register. Id. at § 80b-3(b). The SEC must grant registration unless it finds, after notice to the appli-
cant and a hearing, that the applicant has committed certain offenses. Id. at §§ 80b-3(c)(2) & 80b-
3 (e). See generally Lovitch, The Investment Advisers Act of 1940-Who is an "Investment Adviser?",
24 U. KAN. L. REV. 67 (1975) (discussing applicability and requirements of the Act).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1)-(3) (1982). The Act also prohibits certain types of investment advi-
sory contracts, such as those providing for fees based upon capital gains or appreciation of the
client's portfolio (although compensation based on the total value of a fund averaged over a definite
period is permissible). Id. at § 80b-5.
10. The SEC can deny, suspend, or revoke one's registration for any of several enumerated
offenses, including violation of the IAA. Id. at § 80b-3(e).
11. The SEC can sue to enjoin actual or potential violation of the Act. Id. at § 80b-9(3).
The SEC has exerted increased pressure over the past few years on publishers of investment news-
letters to register by bringing civil and administrative actions. Ingersoll, Regulating Advice: Fitan-
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A publisher of an investment newsletter, however, may avoid register-
ing as an "investment adviser" by qualifying for one of the Act's numer-
ous exclusions.' 3 One exclusion is for "the publisher of any bona fide
newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of general
and regular circulation."' 4 While many courts have addressed the "in-
vestment adviser" issue, ' 5 few have interpreted the bona fide publication
exclusion.' 6 To determine whether publication of nonregistered invest-
ment newsletters is permissible, courts have applied either the IAA's
cial Newsletters Face Growing Pressure to Register with SEC, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1984, at 1, col. 6,
20, col. 1.
12. The Act provides for a fine of up to $10,000 or a prison sentence of five years or both upon
conviction for willfully violating the Act or any rule promulgated thereunder. 15 U.S.C. at § 80b-17
(1982).
The possibility of private civil actions under the Act for violations of the Act is limited. The
Supreme Court held in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), that a private
right of action may be implied under § 215 of the Act, id. at § 80b-15, to void an investment adviser
contract, but declared the Act conferred no other private causes of action. Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors, 444 U.S. at 24. See generally Comment, The Investment Advisers of 1940 and the Supreme
Court: Private Rights of Action Under the New Cort Test, 6 DEL. J. CORP. L. 54 (1981).
13. The Act's definition of "investment adviser" does not include:
(A) a bank...; (B) any lawyer, accountant, engineer, or teacher whose performance of
such services is solely incidental to the practice of his profession; (C) any broker or dealer
whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct of his business as a
broker or dealer and who receives no special compensation therefor; (D) the publisher of
any bona fide newspaper, news magazine or business or financial publication of general and
regular circulation; (E) any person whose advice, analyses, or reports relate to no securities
other than securities which are direct obligations of. . . the United States ... ; (F) such
other persons not within the intent of this paragraph, as the Commission may designate by
rules and regulations or order.
15 US.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (1982). Qualifying for one of these exclusions relieves one of the Act's
requirements, as only "investment advisers" need register under the Act. Id. at § 80b-3(a).
14, Id. at § 80b-2(a)(l 1)(D). This exclusion is hereinafter referred to as the "bona fide publica-
tion exclusion." For comprehensive discussions of this exclusion, see Harroch, The Applicability of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to Financial and Investment Related Publications, 5 J. CORP. L.
55 (1979); Lovitch, supra note 8; cf FEDERAL SECURIEs CODE § 202(78)(B)(iv) (1980) (excluding
".a publisher of a bona fide newspaper or periodical of general and regular circulation, or an owner or
operator of a radio or television station" from the definition of "investment advisor.").
15. See, e.g., Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d 360, 364 (7th Cir. 1981) (professional football player's
agent was not an "investment adviser" under the IAA). See also Annot., 5 A.L.R. FED. 255-56
(1970) & 30-31 (1985 Supp.) (collecting investment adviser cases).
16 See SEC v. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985) (exclusion held applicable); SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d
1294 (7th Cir. 1984) (exclusion not applicable); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (interpreting language of exclusion); SEC v. Wall St. Publish-
ing Inst., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 1070 (D.D.C. 1984) (exclusion not applicable), motion for stay pending
appeal granted, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 91,635, at 99,219-20 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 10, 1984); SEC v.
Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (exclusion not applicable), af'd, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.
1985); Person v. New York Post Corp., 427 F. Supp. 1297 (E.D.N.Y.) (exclusion applicable), affid.
mem., 573 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977).
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bona fide publication exclusion or a first amendment analysis. 7
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals first construed the bona fide pub-
lication exclusion in SEC v. Wall Street Transcript Corporation.18 The
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) charged that the Wall Street
Transcript, a weekly tabloid containing reports on specific securities as
well as verbatim speeches and interviews, could not be circulated unless
its publisher first registered under the IAA. 19 The court held that appli-
cation of the bona fide publication exclusion depended upon the sub-
stance and content of the publication rather than the formal "indicia" of
a newspaper. The court determined that the Transcript's emphasis on
particular securities raised doubts about its qualifying for the exclusion,
and remanded for further proceeding.2 ° On remand the district court
found that the Transcript fell within the bona fide publication
exclusion.2
While the Second Circuit relied on the IAA's statutory exclusion, the
Seventh Circuit, in SEC v. Suter,22 based its decision on a first amend-
ment analysis.23 The Suter court upheld an injunction limiting publica-
tion of an investment newsletter, rejecting the publisher's contention that
the first amendment guarantees the right to publish.24 Using the
17. The only two cases expressly interpreting the language of the bona fide publication exclu-
sion are: SEC v. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985) (majority opinion using statutory analysis and con-
curring opinion using first amendment analysis); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
18. 422 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
19. Id. at 1374. The Transcript typically contained brokerage house reports, reproduced verba-
tim or in summary form, on past performances and future prospects for specific corporations and
their securities. These reports usually contained specific buy and sell recommendations. The Tran-
script also contained records of panel discussions and interviews the publisher conducted, as well as
speeches by corporate executives concerning past and future performances of stocks. SEC v. Wall
St. Transcript Corp., 454 F. Supp. 559, 562-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
20. 422 F.2d at 1378.
21. 454 F. Supp. at 567.
22. 732 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1984).
23. See Note, The Federal Securities Law, the First Amendment and Commercial Speech: A
Call For Consistency, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 57, 66-77 (1984) (analyzing the IAA under first amend-
ment law and concluding that SEC prior restraint is unconstitutional); Comment, SEC v. Lowe: The
Constitutionality of Prohibiting Publication of Investment Newsletters Under the Investment Advisers
Act, 69 MINN. L. REV. 937, 954-59 (1985) (advocating a broad interpretation of the bona fide publi-
cation exclusion to avoid conflict with first amendment rights).
The first amendment provides in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. Suter, an investment adviser registered with the SEC, published an investment newsletter
recommending buy and sell strategies. He used mass advertising mailings to promote this newslet-
ter. 732 F.2d at 1294. Many representations in these advertisements were blatantly false. Id. at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/9
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Supreme Court's freedom of commercial speech test expressed in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York,25 the Suter court found the publication to be misleading. Thus, the
first amendment did not guarantee the right to publish.26
The Supreme Court recently addressed the alternative bona fide publi-
cation exclusion and first amendment rationales in Lowe v. SEC.27 In
Lowe, the SEC sought to prohibit Christopher Lowe and the corpora-
tions he controlled from publishing investment newsletters.28 One of
these companies, Lowe Management Corporation, registered with the
SEC as an investment adviser pursuant to the IAA.29 The SEC later
revoked that registration due to Lowe's conviction of several crimes re-
lating to his investment advising business.30 Lowe ceased offering in-per-
1297. The district court found these advertisements violated the IAA, and issued an injunction
prohibiting publication or distribution of future investment advisory publications unless Suter filed
copies with the SEC. Id. at 1298.
In his defense, Suter argued that he qualified for the bona fide publication exclusion and that the
first amendment protected his right to publish without restriction. The court rejected both these
contentions. Id. at 1298-99.
25. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). The Court has a four-part test for applying the first amendment to
regulation of commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amend-
ment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern law-
ful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id at 566.
26. Suter, 732 F.2d at 1299. Suter's "misleading" newsletter failed the initial step of the Cen-
tral Hudson test. Id. See supra note 25.
27. 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985).
28. Id. at 2560. Lowe served as president and chief shareholder of three corporations: Lowe
Management Corporation, Lowe Publishing Corporation, and Lowe Stock Chart Service, Inc. SEC
v Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1984). These corporations published the Lowe Investment and
Financial Letter and the Lowe Stock Advisory, and solicited subscriptions for the never-published
Lowe Stock Chart Service. Id. at 895. Lowe served as president, research chairman and editor of all
three services. Id. Lowe also offered a "hot-line" telephone service to newsletter subscribers. Id.
See infra note 31 for descriptions of these publications.
29. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2559. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 required all persons falling
within its definition of "investment adviser" to register with the SEC. See supra notes 7 & 8 and
accompanying text.
30. 105 S. Ct. at 2559-60. In 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
convicted Lowe of the misdemeanors of making false representations to a client and failing to regis-
ter in New York State as an investment adviser. In 1978, the Second Circuit convicted Lowe of the
felonies of tampering with physical evidence and third degree larceny. The SEC then instituted
administrative proceedings under § 203 of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) & (f)
(1982), against Lowe and Lowe Management Corporation. In 1981, after a full hearing before an
administrative law judge, the SEC revoked Lowe Management's IAA registration and ordered Lowe
Washington University Open Scholarship
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son investment advice, but continued publishing investment newsletters
containing analyses and recommendations for buying and selling specific
securities.3 '
The SEC brought an action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York alleging that Lowe violated the IAA by
engaging in the business of investment advising without being regis-
tered.32 The SEC also sought to permanently enjoin Lowe and his corpo-
rations from distributing investment advisory newsletters.33 The district
court largely denied the SEC's requested relief,34 but the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed.35 On certiorari the United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the SEC could not prohibit Lowe from pub-
lishing nonpersonalized investment analysis and advice, despite nonregis-
tration as an investment adviser, because his publications fell within the
statutory exclusion for bona fide publications.36
Justice Stevens' majority opinion noted that the Court granted certio-
not to associate with investment advisers. In re Lowe Management Corp., SEC Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 Release No. 759 (May 11, 1981). Lowe did not seek judicial review of that order. 725
F.2d at 894-95.
31. Lowe, 725 F.2d at 895. The Lowe Investment and Financial Newsletter typically contained
general observations on the securities and bullion markets, market strategies, and specific recommen-
dations for buying and selling securities and bullion. This newsletter had approximately 2,408 sub-
scribers and appeared eight times between May 1981 and August 1982. SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp.
1359, 1361 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The Lowe Stock Chart Advisory contained analyses and recommenda-
tions of low-cost stocks. The Advisory appeared four times between May 1981 and November 1982
and had approximately 675 subscriptions, over half of which were complimentary. The Lowe Stock
Chart Service advertised as a weekly service with charts on stocks and bullion prices, but no invest-
ment advice. This newsletter has never been published although it had about 40 subscribers. Id.
32. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2560. The SEC's complaint listed Lowe and all three of his publishing
corporations as defendants, none of which were registered as investment advisers under the IAA at
this time. Id.
33. Id. The SEC also sought enforcement of its 1981 order, and an order that defendants dis-
gorge all subscription money received since 1981. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. at 1362.
34. Id. at 1371. The district court concluded that the IAA, construed to avoid impermissible
encroachment on first amendment rights, did not authorize a prior restraint on the freedom to pub-
lish. Id. at 1361. The court thus denied the petition for temporary and permanent injunctions. The
court also denied the request for disgorgement of subscription money received. The court did, how-
ever, issue an injunction prohibiting Lowe and his corporations from giving securities information by
telephone, individual letter or in person. Id. at 1371.
35. SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d 892, 902 (2d Cir. 1984). The court of appeals held that Lowe's
newsletters were subject to the registration requirements of the IAA, and that revoking registration
and barring future publication of the newsletters did not violate the first amendment. Id. at 898,
902. See also Comment, SEC v. Lowe: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Publication of Investment
Newsletters Under the Investment Advisers Act, 69 MINN. L. REv. 937 (1985) (criticizing the Court
of Appeals' first amendment analysis).
36. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2573-74.
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rari to decide whether the first amendment precluded an injunction
prohibiting Lowe from publishing his newsletter, but quickly subrogated
this issue by stating the Court should not decide constitutional issues if
another resolution of the case existed.37 Justice Stevens examined the
legislative history of the IAA to determine that Congress intended the
IAA to apply only to specific advice rendered on an individual basis,
thereby avoiding licensing of nonpersonalized investment publications
because of first amendment concerns.38
Believing that intent supported an expansive reading of the bona fide
publication exclusion, the majority broadly interpreted the language of
the exclusion. The majority construed "bona fide" to mean "genuine," in
the sense of containing disinterested commentary and analysis, as op-
posed to self-promotional "touting."39 The majority interpreted the
phrase "general and regular circulation" to mean "regular" in the securi-
ties industry sense of "not timed to affect the market," rather than in the
ordinary sense of "consistent periodic circulation."' The majority in-
tended this construction to exclude publications merely issued "from
time to time" and those put out by "hit and run tipsters."4 The majority
stressed that specific advice did not give investment advice a personalized
character and that Lowe's publications did not offer individual advice
attuned to specific needs.42 Thus, the newsletters fit the literal language
of the bona fide publication exclusion and Lowe's unregistered status did
37. Id. at 2557, 2562-63, citing Escambia County v. McMillan, 104 S. Ct. 1577, 1579 (1984)
(per curiam).
38. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. at 2563-69. The majority quoted from a number of hearings and reports,
repeatedly emphasizing passages suggesting that Congress intended the IAA to apply only to specific
advice rendered on an individual basis. In Senate Hearings, one expert witness distinguished invest-
ment counseling as "a personal-service profession and depends for its success upon a close and confi-
dential relationship... between us and our clients." Id. at 2565-66 (citation omitted). The majority
reasoned that "although neither the text of the Act nor its legislative history defines the precise
scope" of the bona fide publication exclusion, those two points seem "tolerably clear." Id. at 2570.
39. Id. "Touting" refers to promotion of securities in which the touter has some interest. Id. at
2571-72.
40 Id. at 2573.
41. Id. at 2571. The Court uses the term "tipsters" to refer to persons who advertise in newspa-
pers offering to send a list of stocks sure to rise, in return for payment. Id. at 2571 n.51 (quoting
Senate Hearings, testimony of Douglas T. Johnston).
42, Id. at 2572. The majority distinguished its interpretation of the bona fide publication exclu-
sion from that of the court in SEC v. Wall Street Transcript by arguing that the court's interpretation
lacked the central thrust of the legislative history-that Congress directed the Act at personalized
advice tailored to individual client's concerns. Id.
Number 2]
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not justify a prohibition on publication.43
In contrast to the majority opinion's statutory approach, Justice
White's concurring opinion adopted a constitutional analysis, stating
that the first amendment protected Lowe's right to continue publishing
investment newsletters.' After criticizing the majority's avoidance of
the constitutional issue on which it granted certiorari, the concurrence
considered whether Lowe qualified for the bona fide publication exclu-
sion.45 Justice White regarded the majority's interpretation of the exclu-
sion as overly broad,46 wrongfully rendering superfluous key language in
the IAA's definition of "investment adviser."'47  The concurrence then
viewed the legislative history as revealing a congressional intent for the
Act to cover publishers of investment newsletters.48 The concurrence
concluded its statutory analysis by stating that the majority's exclusion
of Lowe's publications from registration is contrary to the statute's lan-
guage, legislative history and administrative construction,49 and that
Lowe should have registered the newsletters.5 0
The concurring opinion next considered the constitutional question of
whether the first amendment allowed government prohibition of publica-
tion of investment advice. Justice White viewed that prohibition as a
clear restraint on speech. He acknowledged that some restraints can be
permissible, but found the Act, as a ban on speech in the form of newslet-
ters containing investment advice, presumptively invalid as applied to
fully protected speech. Moreover, even under the less-protected com-
mercial speech analysis, the concurrence considered the means of regula-
tion too extreme and thus invalid.' The concurrence would have held
43. Id. at 2572-74. The Court noted this resolution relieved it of the need to address the consti-
tutional question on which it granted certiorari. Id.
44. Id. at 2575.
45. Id.
46. Justice White criticized the majority's interpretation of the bona fide publication exclusion
as unworkably broad. Id. at 2576-78. He saw the purpose of the exclusion as differentiating between
publications devoted wholly or primarily to investment advice and publications with more diversified
and general coverage. Id. at 2577 n.4.
47. Id. at 2576-77. Justice White believes a broad interpretation of the bona fide publication
exclusion which covers all publications with advice not personally tailored to an individual client
renders superfluous the disjunctive descriptions in the IAA of investment advisers as engaging in the
business of giving investment advice, through publications or through issuing analyses or reports
concerning securities. Id.
48. Id. at 2578.
49. Id. at 2580.
50. Id. at 2586.




the IAA inapplicable in precluding publication of impersonal investment
advice by nonregistered advisers like Lowe.
5 2
While Justice Stevens' majority opinion reached a desirable result, its
analysis is subject to criticism. Justice Stevens' conclusion depends
wholly on his construction of the vague and ambiguous language of the
bona fide publication exclusion, as guided by his interpretation of the
legislative history.53  Justice Stevens' premise contains significant
weaknesses.
The legislative history is not clearly indicative of congressional intent.
The fact that three of the eight Justices considering the matter reached
an opposite interpretation of this history demonstrates the considerable
ambiguity of Congress' intent. As Justice White stated, the majority re-
lies too heavily on the "self-serving statements" of securities industry
representatives. 54
The language of the bona fide publication exclusion is of doubtful ap-
plicability to Lowe's newsletters. While the majority's interpretation of
"bona fide" as "disinterested" 55 is plausible, an interpretation of "ordi-
nary" or "typical" appears closer to the language's plain meaning. The
majority's interpretation of "general and regular circulation 56 is more
specious. "Ordinary" and "typical" suggest a nonspecialized publication
appearing on a consistent schedule. Of Lowe's three publications, one
had not yet been published and boasted only forty subscribers. Another
advertised as a semimonthly publication but actually appeared only eight
times in fifteen months. A third appeared only four times in six months
and had only 675 subscriptions, over half of which were complimen-
tary.57 These facts stretch the description of "general and regular circu-
lation" beyond semantic resilience.
The majority's questionable statutory analysis resulted from its deter-
mination to avoid the constitutional issue on which it granted certiorari.
In this case,5" the majority's reluctance to interpret the Constitution is
not justifiable. Investment advisers have asserted and will continue to
52. Id. at 2587.
53. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
54. 105 S. Ct. at 2579 n.7 (White, J., concurring).
55. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
57. See supra note 31. The district court actually described the second publication as "irregu-
lar." SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
58. Justice White sharply criticized the majority's refusal to consider the constitutional ques-
tion. 105 S. Ct. at 2575, 2582.
Number 2]
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assert first amendment defenses to actions seeking to limit or prohibit
publication of investment newsletters.59 The federal courts need gui-
dance on this difficult issue, and publishers need to know their specific
rights so they can conduct their businesses vigorously within the bounds
of the law. The majority opinion gives little guidance or predictability.
If Lowe's publications meet the bona fide publication exclusion, then al-
most any newsletter could-a result that Congress clearly did not intend.
Instead of imputing specialized meaning to vague terms, the concur-
ring opinion interpreted the exclusion's language in a more restrictive
manner.' Justice White found that Lowe's publications lacked the
"bona fide" and "general and regular" nature that the bona fide publica-
tion exclusion requires.
The concurrence based its conclusion instead on an acceptable consti-
tutional analysis, noting that the IAA's registration requirements do re-
strict freedom of expression. The concurrence correctly narrowed its
consideration to whether this restriction was permissible in this case.6'
Although Justice White summarily distinguished between fully protected
speech and commercial speech,62 his conclusion is correct. Prohibiting
Lowe from publishing newsletters would impermissibly restrict his free
speech and publication rights. While the SEC must afford adequate pro-
tection to investors, the Commission should note that none of Lowe's
subscribers have complained of any wrongdoing.63 The purpose of the
securities laws is to ensure full and adequate disclosure,' not to infringe
on fundamental first amendment rights. There is no need for govern-
mental infringement of basic rights to protect investors from nonexistent
problems.
Moreover, both the majority and concurring opinions fail to consider
two public policy concerns that support their conclusions. First, both
the majority and concurring analyses open the door for increased compe-
59. Three cases have directly considered the issue. See SEC v. Lowe, 105 S. Ct. 2557 (1985);
SEC v. Suter, 732 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1984); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371
(1970). cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958. One commentator has noted the "inherent tension" between the
first amendment and the securities laws. See Fried, Convicted Analyst Geis Right to Publish Advice,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1983, at Dl, col. 1, D19, col. 3 (quoting former SEC Commissioner Richard
Smith).
60. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
62. See 105 S. Ct. at 2586 (not necessary to determine whether newsletter contained fully pro-
tected or commercial speech).
63. Id. at 2661.
64. See supra note 5.
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tition in the investment publications market.65 In a field in which suc-
cessful prediction and analysis are readily measurable, increased
competition offers investors a discernable choice of investment assistance.
Increased competition should also serve to raise the cumulative quality
level of these publications. Lack of demand will curtail publication of
newsletters proving to be inaccurate or less helpful than others. 66 Sec-
ond, private actions under section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act6 7 and rule 10(b)-5 61 already provide aggrieved buyers and sellers
with adequate remedies for manipulative or deceptive investment
publications.69
Although the Lowe Court reached a proper conclusion, a first amend-
ment rationale would have provided a stronger foundation. If the
Supreme Court does decide the constitutional question that it side-
stepped in Lowe, the Court will have sound guidance in Justice White's
concurring opinion.
Robert G. Oesch
65. A former SEC attorney has noted the Lowe decision "will prompt a great deal of en-
treprenurial activity" in investment newsletters. See Wermeil, High Court Rules Certain Newsletters
Are Exempt From Regulation By SEC, Wall St. J., June 11, 1985, at 3, col. 2 (quoting Harvey Pitt).
66. Although it is conceivable the increased number of newsletters could dilute the investment
newsletter field with lower quality advice, this seems less likely than a general rise in the amount and
quality of the newsletters on the market, as higher levels of helpfulness or accuracy should be re-
warded with increased subscriptions.
67. Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (1982),
provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly .... (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
68. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to § l0b and codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1985), provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly .... (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under with
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
69. See, e.g., SEC v. Blavin, 557 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (publisher of investment
advisory newsletter found in violation of § 10b and rule lOb-5), agid, 760 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1985).
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